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Abstract 
 
We set up a two-country, regional model of trade in financial services. Competitive firms in 
each country manufacture untraded consumer goods in an uncertain productive environment, 
borrowing funds from a bank in either the home or the foreign market. Duopolistic banks can 
choose their levels of monitoring of firms and thus the levels of risk-taking, where the risk of 
bank failure is partly borne by taxpayers in the banks’ home countries. Moreover, each bank 
chooses the share of its lending allocated between domestic and foreign firms, but the bank’s 
overall loan volume is fixed by a capital requirement set optimally in its home country. In this 
setting we consider two types of financial integration. A reduction in the transaction costs of 
cross-border banking reduces aggregate output and increases risk-taking, thus harming 
consumers and taxpayers in both countries. In contrast, a reduction in the costs of screening 
foreign firms is likely to be beneficial for banks, consumers, and taxpayers alike. 
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1 Introduction
International trade in banking services has increased rapidly over the last few decades,
and in particular during the past 15 years. Total international bank lending accelerated
sharply after 2000, almost quadrupling between 2000 and 2008, by which point it had
reached 40% of world GDP. Since then, cross-border banking has receded noticeably,
but the worldwide volume of cross-border claims is still more than twice what it was in
2000 (see Figure 1).1 More disaggregated evidence comes from a database with more
than 5000 banks in 137 countries (Claessens and van Horen, 2014). This documents
large increases in the presence of foreign banks in most countries since the mid-1990s,
but also a substantial heterogeneity at the country level with respect to the importance
of foreign banks in national banking sectors.
Figure 1: Worldwide cross-border claims of banking sectors (1980-2016)
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Source: BIS Statistics (2016), Table A4.1, stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/a4.1
The financial crisis of 2008 has shown that this increasing internationalization in the
banking sector is not without risk. Many banks worldwide have suffered huge losses
1For more details, see Committee on the Global Financial System (2010), Graph 1.
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from subprime financial products that originated in the US housing market (Diamond
and Rajan, 2009).2 Financial integration was thus a key factor in transforming the
crisis in the US housing market into a worldwide banking crisis, during which large
financial institutions in many countries had to be rescued by taxpayer monies. In
several countries, including Ireland and Iceland, the bailouts were so massive as to
threaten the entire state of public finances.3
The financial crisis has therefore re-invigorated the debate as to whether increasing
internationalization in the banking industry is a desirable development that should be
fostered by policy measures to reduce the costs of cross-border banking. One important
reason as to why the increasing internationalization of the banking sector may increase
its exposure to risk is the limited information about foreign loan markets. Empirical
evidence shows that “gravity models”, in which distance acts as a proxy for information
costs or information asymmetries, are able to explain international transactions in
financial services at least as well as they can explain goods-trade transactions (Portes,
Rey, and Oh, 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005). Evidence consistent with a theory in which
geographical distance acts as a proxy for information costs comes from Acharya, Hasan
and Sauners (2006). They show, for a sample of Italian banks during the 1990s, that
geographic and sectoral diversification increased the risk of banks’ lending portfolios.
Similarly, Berger et al. (2005) find that large banks operate at a greater distance
than smaller banks and monitor these distant loans less intensively, implying a higher
exposure to asset risk.4
More generally, however, financial integration in the banking sector may have several,
and possible conflicting, effects on the equilibrium level of risk-taking in banks. For
example, if economic integration reduces the costs of accessing foreign markets, but
information costs remain unchanged and are higher for foreign as compared to domestic
2Econometric evidence for a sample of large banks across the world confirms that, during this
period, the exposure to the US real estate market was a factor that significantly contributed to stock
market losses (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).
3The government of Iceland decided to guarantee deposits of domestic investors, but declined to
guarantee the deposits of foreigners. Ireland, in contrast, bailed out both domestic and international
creditors with taxpayer money. In the fiscal year 2010 alone, this caused an Irish budget deficit equal
to 32% of the country’s GDP.
4This evidence is not undisputed, however. Goetz, Laeven and Levine (2016) have recently found
the opposite result, showing for a US sample of bank holding companies that geographic expansion
reduced banks’ risks.
2
customers, then the aggregate level of risk-taking in banks may well increase as a result
of falling international transaction costs. Alternatively, if financial integration reduces
information costs for banks of supplying foreign customers with credit, then integration
is much more likely to reduce the risks that banks incur with their equilibrium loan
portfolio.
Against this background, the present paper aims to study the welfare effects of financial
integration in a setting that incorporates several characteristics of the banking sector.
We set up a model of international trade in services where two banks, one located
in each country, engage in cross-border lending to small, competitive firms and make
monitoring decisions that determine the riskiness of their operations in their domes-
tic and foreign markets. International lending is subject to two frictions that are not
present when banks lend domestically. Firstly, foreign loans are subject to a transac-
tion cost that arises, for example, from foreign loans being denominated in a different
currency, or the need to employ the services of a foreign-based intermediary. This will
make foreign lending more costly and hence less profitable than lending to domestic
firms. Secondly, information costs are higher for lending in the foreign country than
in the domestic one due, for example, to diverging national laws and regulations. We
shall show that these information asymmetries result in banks monitoring foreign firms
less well, resulting in more risky lending in foreign markets.
Another feature of financial markets is that they are heavily regulated. Our model
incorporates the fact that the riskiness of bank operations also affects taxpayers, as
exemplified by the cases of Ireland and Iceland mentioned above. In our model these
spillovers arise not from discrete bail-out decisions, but from government guarantees
for the savings deposits that banks use to finance their loans. Such deposit insurance
schemes exist in virtually all developed countries, exposing taxpayers to the risks of
national bank failures and creating a fundamental moral hazard problem for banks.
We consequently model active governments, setting an optimal capital adequacy stan-
dard that forces a bank to hold a minimum amount of equity for each loan it provides.
This capital regulation reduces the bank’s moral hazard and limits its total loan vol-
ume. In setting the optimal capital adequacy standard, the government balances the
impact of its regulation policy on the bank’s aggregate profits in the domestic and
foreign markets, the expected costs to taxpayers that arise in the case of bank failure,
and the real effects that the availability of credit has for expected output and hence
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consumer surplus.
While binding capital regulation fixes the total volume of lending, each bank is left to
determine the share of its lending to firms in its home market and those in the foreign
market. Moreover, banks choose the level of monitoring, and hence the riskiness of their
loans, in each market. In the presence of implicit subsidies to risk-taking resulting from
the government guarantees, banks will choose too little monitoring and their lending
choice will be distorted towards the more risky activity in the foreign market.
In this setting, the focus of our analysis is on the effects that financial integration will
have on banks, consumers and taxpayers in each country. We show that these effects
differ critically depending on which international friction is reduced.
If economic and financial integration lowers the transaction costs for cross-border lend-
ing, while information costs remain unchanged, then the effects of closer integration
are predominantly negative. Overall lending and aggregate output would fall in equilib-
rium, as a result of each bank redirecting more of any given total loan volume towards
its foreign market, where its costs are higher. At the same time, the average riskiness
of bank lending and hence the expected losses to taxpayers increase, as each bank
makes relatively more loans in its foreign market where information is more costly and
monitoring levels are therefore lower.
In contrast, if the information costs in the foreign market fall as a result of financial
integration, then the effects of such a policy are most likely positive. A shift towards
greater lending in the foreign market is now accompanied by increased monitoring,
raising expected consumer surplus while reducing the risks to taxpayers. The conclu-
sion from our analysis is, therefore, that it is crucial for financial integration to be
accompanied by policies that increase market transparency and reduce information
costs, through such instruments as common banking standards and a coordination of
national laws pertaining to the enforcement of defaulting loans.
1.1 Related literature
Our paper combines elements from across the economics literature. With respect to
international trade theory, there is a small strand of literature that explicitly examines
the banking sector. Following the early work by Eaton (1994), Lehner and Schnitzer
(2008) analyze the spillover effects of FDI in the banking sector on the host country’s
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banking system. In contrast, Niepmann (2015) and de Blas and Russ (2013) analyze
banks’ choices between foreign direct investment and cross-border lending. These pa-
pers do not incorporate any policy instruments, however.5 On the other hand, a sizeable
literature has studied the effects of economic integration on policy competition in trade
models with imperfect competition (e.g., Kind, Midelfart and Schjelderup, 2005; Ot-
taviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Haufler and Wooton, 2010), but these have not been
applied to the specific policy issues facing the banking sector.
We also draw on the literature on capital regulation. Several authors have stressed that,
in a closed economy, capital regulation increases the risk buffer of banks and curbs risky
behaviour (Rochet, 1992; Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000). De Nicolo`, Gamba and
Lucchetta (2012) study optimal capital regulation in a dynamic model of banking in a
closed economy. The literature on regulatory competition in the banking sector stresses
the result that nationally set capital standards are inefficiently low from a global welfare
perspective (Sinn, 1997; Acharya, 2003). The present paper is closest to Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez (2006), where regulators choose nationally optimal capital requirements by
trading off the aggregate level of banks’ profits against the benefits of financial stability.
We extend their model and link it to the trade literature, incorporating different types
of trade frictions. This allows us to study the effects of financial integration on different
agents in the economy, and on national welfare.
A final related literature strand studies issues of risk-taking in connection with the
internationalization strategies of banks. The theoretical contributions in this literature
are typically based on portfolio-choice models, however, and the microeconomic con-
tributions are primarily empirical (e.g., Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Buch, Koch, and
Koetter, 2013; Ongena, Popov and Udell, 2013).
The remainder of this paper is set up as follows. Section 2 introduces our trade model
with goods production and cross-border lending by banks. Section 3 studies the opti-
mal capital regulation by the government. Section 4 analyzes the effects of financial
integration, focusing on reductions in trade costs on the one hand and reductions in in-
formation costs on the other. Section 5 studies, by means of numerical simulations, how
the different types of financial integration feed back on governments’ optimal regulation
policy. Section 6 concludes.
5The general literature on trade in services and public policy is surveyed in Francois and Hoekman
(2010).
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2 The model
We consider a region composed of two countries i and j. In each country, goods are
manufactured by competitive firms that have to borrow in order to be able to produce
the output of non-tradeable goods. Each country is the host to a single bank, which
can lend to producers in either country. In this respect the model is closely related to
the “reciprocal dumping” model of international trade in identical products, originally
developed by Brander and Krugman (1983). In the absence of international lending,
each bank would be a monopolist in its domestic market. The opportunity to trade in
lending results in each bank seeking to acquire a share in its foreign market. This is
done by offering loans that are fundamentally identical to those offered by the domestic
incumbent but, due to the greater distance between bank and borrower, are more
expensive to provide.
Our model departs from that of Brander and Krugman in several further respects.
Firstly, the notion of “distance” in our model is not confined to the (“iceberg”) trade
costs of Brander and Krugman (1983). Such trade costs do exist in our model, and they
can be interpreted as the additional transaction costs of supplying a loan to foreign
customers. In addition, however, we also consider higher information costs faced by
a bank that arise from it being less familiar with the legal framework and potential
borrowers in a foreign country. As a consequence, banks may choose to exert different
levels of effort in monitoring their domestic and foreign loans.
Secondly, each bank’s activities are regulated by its national government. Regulators
of the banks set equity requirements that can limit the aggregate quantity of loans
that banks are able to offer to firms. Consequently, when this restriction is binding
on a bank, it faces a choice as to where to lend its limited funds. The absence of
a binding restriction would permit a bank to “segment” its markets, setting lending
in each country independently of conditions in the other market. If, however, overall
lending is constrained, the bank has to decide upon its lending to the two countries
simultaneously. Finally, banks face a fundamental moral hazard incentive in our model,
arising from their limited liability. In the event of failure, bank owners are affected only
to the extent that the bank’s operations are financed by equity, while the losses accruing
to depositors are covered by deposit insurance schemes and eventually have to be met
by taxpayers. This distorts the banks’ choices towards lending in their more risky,
foreign markets.
6
The timing in our model is as follows. In the first stage, each of the two governments
simultaneously sets the equity requirement for its bank. In the second stage, the banks
decide upon their lending to each market. When the total funds available to lend exceed
a bank’s desired lending, then the bank treats each market separately. If, in contrast,
the equity requirement is binding, then the bank decides upon the shares of the funds
to lend to firms in its domestic and foreign markets. In the third stage, the banks choose
the level of monitoring of loans in each of their markets. Finally, in the fourth stage,
firms produce output that is sold and consumed domestically. We solve the model using
backwards induction.
2.1 Goods production
Homogeneous goods are produced in each country by small, competitive firms. There
are no fixed costs to production, but each firm requires a bank loan to finance its output
activity. Every firm plans to produce one unit of output using a single unit of an input.
This input is the numeraire, such that a firm has to borrow a single unit of currency
in order to acquire its services. Firms have the choice of whether to borrow from the
local bank or the foreign bank. Each firm in country i with a loan from a bank based
in country h ∈ {i, j} succeeds in production with probability qih. This probability of
success is a positive function of the level of monitoring offered by the lender. A profit-
maximising, small firm will be indifferent between the two lenders when its expected
profits are the same regardless of the source of funds.
Expected output, Qi, in country i is
Qi = qiiLii + qijLij (1)
where Lih is the number of loans made by bank h in country i. The good is produced
exclusively for domestic consumption. The market inverse demand curve for the good
is linear, with the expected price, Pi, being
Pi = A− biQi. (2)
Substituting (1) into (2) yields the expected price as a function of the expected success
of the loans in the market,
Pi = A− bi (qiiLii + qijLij) . (3)
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Expected profit for a firm in country i borrowing from bank h at cost Rih is
piih = qih (Pi −Rih) + (1− qih) 0 ∀h ∈ {i.j}. (4)
Firms that fail earn nothing and default on their loans while each successful firm will
sell its (unit of) output at the prevailing price. We assume that there is free entry into
the goods sector and consequently zero expected profits. This means, from (4), that
the cost of a loan from either bank must equal the expected price of the product:6
Ri = Rih = Pi ∀ h ∈ {i, j}. (5)
For the remainder of the paper we shall use Ri to represent the price in country i. De-
mand for loans can be seen as the derived demand for the consumption good that is
produced by firms using these bank loans. Thus the expected price of loans made by
banks in country i is
Ri = A− bi (qiiLii + qijLij) . (6)
2.2 Banks
There are two banks, one based in each country. Each bank can lend in both markets,
but faces higher costs in its foreign market where, for example, it may have to engage the
services of a local financial intermediary. There is no opportunity for firms to arbitrage
loans internationally. If the banks’ ability to lend were unlimited, the markets would
be segmented, in that lending decisions could be made separately for each market.
However, the leading case in our analysis is characterized by the total lending volume
of each bank being restricted by capital regulation. Consequently each bank must
determine the volume of its loans to each market, subject to the total amount of loans
that it is able to make. We denote the total amount of loans made by the bank based
in country i by Li. The share of bank i’s lending to its domestic market is γi, whereas
the share (1− γi) goes to firms in country j. The allocation of loans between the two
6Eq. (5) implies that a firm is indifferent between two equally priced loans in our model, regardless
of the levels of monitoring associated with the loans. This is because the firms have zero expected
profits. If a firm is successful with production, it repays the loan with the revenue from selling its
output. If a firm fails, it defaults on its loan. In either circumstance, the firm breaks even. Thus
monitoring of a loan only affects the expected profits of the lending institution, not the firm.
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markets can then be written as
Lii = γiLi, Lij = (1− γj)Lj,
Lji = (1− γi)Li, Ljj = γjLj.
(7)
Banks’ funds come from two sources: a combination of savings deposits and equity. We
assume that all of bank i’s deposit finance comes from residents of country i. In line
with actual practice in virtually all OECD countries, we further assume that savings
deposits in country i are insured against bank failures by the government, and hence
eventually the taxpayers, of country i.7 Therefore depositors do not face any risk and
we assume that they supply their savings to the bank for a fixed return, normalized to
unity. On the other hand, the equity holders in bank i partly reside in country i, but
may also be residents of a third country outside the union.8 This is consistent with a
setting where countries i and j are small in the world capital market, but investors in
each country exhibit a home bias for their national bank. We denote the total equity
of bank i by Ei and assume, for analytical simplicity, that each bank’s cost of equity
is also unity.9
The banking regulator in country i imposes a capital-adequacy standard, ki, that rep-
resents the minimum proportion of bank lending that is backed by the bank’s equity,
as opposed to consumer deposits. The total lending of a bank, Li, may then be limited
by the quantity of equity that it owns:
Li ≤
Ei
ki
. (8)
We shall investigate the implications of (8) being a binding constraint on the bank’s
lending activities, where it has to balance the benefits of lending in one market relative
to the other.
7The main argument for deposit insurance is that it prevents bank runs and thereby stabilizes
the banking system (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). See Barth, Lee and Phumiwasana (2006) for an
overview of deposit insurance schemes around the world, and for a discussion of its benefits and costs.
8In other words, bank i’s profit may accrue only partially to domestic residents. As we will see below,
cross-ownership of country j’s residents in bank i has the same implications as domestic ownership in
our analysis, since we focus on symmetric equilibria and do not consider policy competition between
countries i and j.
9The usual assumption in the literature is that the cost of equity is fixed at a level equal to or
higher than the cost of savings deposits (Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Allen, Carletti and Marquez,
2011). In such a setting, higher capital requirements increase the bank’s cost of equity for two reasons,
the higher cost of equity and the reduced subsidization by taxpayers. We simplify the analysis by
eliminating the first of these effects but, importantly, maintain the second.
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With these specifications, the costs of finance for bank i in its local and foreign markets
are, respectively,
Cii = 1− (1− qii) (1− ki) ,
Cji = (1 + τ)− (1− qji) (1− ki) .
(9)
In the expression for Cji, the term τ reflects the additional transaction cost of servicing
a loan in the bank’s foreign market. One example of such costs are the fees charged by
foreign financial intermediaries which are often involved in loan contracts with foreign
firms, in order to reduce the risk of a loan default. Another example are the extra
transaction costs of hedging the exchange rate risk associated with a foreign loan.
The second term in each expression in (9) reflects the implicit subsidy from the taxpayer
that the bank will receive as a result of deposit insurance. The subsidy equals the
product of the probability of default (1 − qhi) and the share of financing through
deposits (1 − ki). To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that the risks across the
different firms in each country are perfectly correlated so that the probability of failure
by firms equals the probability that bank i will also fail.10 Hence, the (expected) costs
of bank failures are partly borne by the taxpayers of the bank’s country of residence.11
An increase in the capital requirement ki reduces this implicit subsidy to the bank and
thus raises its cost of finance Ci.
Monitoring decision. We assume that a bank can affect the probability that a firm
succeeds through the level of monitoring, or support, that the bank provides.12 The
greater the monitoring, the greater the likelihood that the good will be produced and
sold, and the higher the probability that the loan will be repaid. Suppose that the
likelihood of a firm’s success is linear in monitoring such that (with the appropriate
normalisation) qhi of monitoring by bank i to a firm in country h yields a probability
10See Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) for a similar assumption.
11Our analysis abstracts from insurance funds paid by the banking sector. From 2016 onwards the
member states of the European Union, for example, are building up an EU-wide ‘resolution fund’,
financed by levies on member states’ banks. This fund, however, is built up only gradually and with
a moderate overall target volume.
12One possible interpretation is that by monitoring the producing entrepreneur, the bank induces
him to supply more effort, thus increasing the probability of success (Besanko and Kanatas, 1993).
Alternatively, monitoring can also be interpreted as the bank acquiring a knowledge that is com-
plementary to that of the firm, helping the firm to raise its chance of success (Boot and Thakor,
2000).
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of industrial success equal to qhi. Thus monitoring of qhi results in the bank’s expected
earnings on the loan equalling Rhqhi.
While monitoring raises the expected return on a loan, it is costly to provide. We as-
sume that monitoring costs are quadratic in the amount of monitoring and that they
are sufficiently large that there will never be perfect monitoring in equilibrium. For do-
mestic loans, the monitoring costs are thus given by sq2ii/2, where s (> 0) is a constant.
Foreign loans face higher monitoring costs as a result of higher information costs for
foreign customers.13 In general, information costs are higher for banks when lending
in foreign markets because of the different institutional and legal setting in which the
foreign customer operates. These differences are particularly important when it comes
to (partially) recovering the loan in the case of a borrower default. The European
Commission (2015, p. 23), for example, stresses in its action plan for a capital markets
union in Europe, that differences in insolvency, collateral and securities laws represent
important barriers for cross-border lending.14 In our model these costs are specified as
s(1+σ)q2ji/2, where σ (> 0) parameterizes the extra information costs of foreign loans.
Each bank makes an individual decision as to how much monitoring it should conduct
on each loan. As firms are assumed to be identical, a bank will optimally choose the
same level of monitoring for all firms in a particular (domestic or foreign) market.
The banks will take the price of the loan Ri [which equals the expected price of output
from (5)] as given when making their monitoring decision. The reason why firms cannot
strategically exploit their market power through their monitoring decision is that the
risks of firms in each country are perfectly correlated (see above). While lowering qhi
would increase the probability that all firms fail, it will not increase the market price
that firms receive when they - simultaneously - succeed. Hence firms will not increase
their willingness to pay for a bank loan when the bank’s monitoring level falls.
The expected operating profit of bank i is Πi, which is the sum of its net expected
earnings in its home and foreign markets. Using (7), this can be written as
Πi = αiiLii + αjiLji, (10)
13See Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) for empirical evidence that information costs are rising in the
distance between borrowers and lenders.
14See also Degryse et al.(2016) for a recent empirical study of how institutional and legal differences
across countries affect banks’ recovery rates on collateral. This study incorporates detailed data of
firms’ underlying assets pledged as collateral for a bank loan.
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where αii and αji are bank i’s expected returns on domestic and foreign loans, respec-
tively:
αii ≡ Riqii − Cii −
s
2
q2ii; αji ≡ Rjqji − Cji −
s (1 + σ)
2
q2ji. (11)
In (11), the costs of finance are as given in (9), whereas the last term in each expression
represents the monitoring costs for domestic and foreign loans, respectively.
Substituting (11) into (10) and differentiating with respect to levels of monitoring
(treating expected price as a constant), yields first-order conditions for the profit-
maximising levels of monitoring in both markets:
q∗ii =
Ri − (1− ki)
s
; q∗ji =
Rj − (1− ki)
s (1 + σ)
. (12)
A bank’s monitoring of firms in a market is positively related both to the price and
to the capital constraint facing the bank. High prices make successful performance
more rewarding while a higher capital constraint, by reducing the share of subsidized
deposit financing, increases the cost of failure from the bank’s perspective. Finally, and
importantly, the probability of a failing loan is always greater for the foreign operations
of a bank, because of the higher information costs associated with foreign lending.15
The monitoring levels in (12) can be substituted into (11) to find the expected earnings
on optimally monitored loans in each market:
α∗ii =
[Ri − (1− ki)]
2
2s
− ki; α
∗
ji =
[Rj − (1− ki)]
2
2s (1 + σ)
− (ki + τ) . (13)
Loan allocation. The optimal allocation of lending between bank i’s markets is
found by partially differentiating (10) with respect to γi, taking into account (6) and
(7). This gives the first-order condition
∂Πi
∂γi
= α∗ii − α
∗
ji −
[
γibiq
∗2
ii − (1− γi) bjq
∗2
ji
]
Li = 0. (14)
Solving and rearranging yields the optimal allocation of lending
γ∗i =
s (1 + σ)
[
(1 + σ)φ2ii − φ
2
ji + 2s (1 + σ) τ
]
+ 2Libjφ
2
ji
2Li
[
(1 + σ)2 biφ2ii + bjφ
2
ji
] , (15)
15In a setting where the risks are perfectly correlated between the firms in each country, such a
difference between the risks involved for domestic and foreign banks can be interpreted, for example,
by each bank being more familiar with its domestic legal system, and therefore being better able to
monitor or support domestic firms in the face of macroeconomic shocks.
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where φhi is bank i’s return on a successful loan in market h, net of the cost of deposit
finance:
φii ≡ Ri − (1− ki) , φji ≡ Rj − (1− ki) . (16)
Symmetry. Suppose now that the two countries are identical to each other, such
that they have the same population size b = bi = bj, and have identical prices (for
goods and loans) R = Ri = Rj. This implies φji = φii ≡ φi in (16). We also assume
that the banks behave optimally with respect to their monitoring and lending decisions
such that we can suppress the asterisk (∗) from here on.
We can use the symmetry to determine the values of the exogenous parameters in
our model that will ensure that the banks’ optimal monitoring decisions yield interior
solutions. For both qii < 1 and qji < 1 to hold in (12) we need that φi < s. At the
same time, to ensure that expected earnings in both markets are positive, αii > 0
and αji > 0, in (13) requires that φ
2
i > 2s(1 + σ)(ki + τ). These conditions can be
simultaneously fulfilled only if
s > φi > 2(1 + σ)(ki + τ). (17)
Condition (17) thus places an upper bound on the additional monitoring cost in the
foreign market, σ, relative to both the domestic monitoring cost parameter s, and the
bank’s return on a successful loan φi. We will use this condition in our analysis below.
We can further exploit the symmetry in order to simplify our expression [eq. (15)] for
the optimal share of lending allocated to the home market:
γi =
1
bLi
[
(1 + σ)2 + 1
]
[
bLi +
s (1 + σ) σ
2
+
s2 (1 + σ)2 τ
[R− (1− ki)]
2
]
. (18)
If the banks do not face any additional costs for operating in the foreign market, then
both τ = 0 and σ = 0. Consequently, (18) further simplifies to γi = 1/2 (see Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez, 2006).
More generally, however, the share of domestic bank loans, γi, can be greater or less
than 1/2. To see this, we focus on the role of the cross-border information cost σ and
set τ = 0 in (18). Subtracting 1/2 from both sides gives
γi|τ=0 −
1
2
=
σ[s(1 + σ)− b(Ei/ki)(2 + σ)]
2b(Ei/ki)[(1 + σ)2 + 1]
≷ 0, (19)
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where we have substituted (8) for Li to highlight the dependence of the inequality on
the capital requirement ki.
Equation (19) shows an important property of our model. Even though they face higher
information costs for foreign loans, banks may provide more loans in their foreign
markets than in their domestic markets. This is because banks are effectively subsidized
by taxpayers through the deposit insurance scheme. Since this subsidy is proportional
to the risk of failure, the foreign loans of each bank receive a disproportionate subsidy
compared to their domestic loans. This leads to the (expected) marginal costs of finance
being lower for foreign loans compared to domestic loans, if the trade cost parameter τ
is low [see eq. (9) taking into account that qii > qji from (12)]. Hence, banks will enter
foreign markets “aggressively” when the costs of failure are shared with taxpayers at
home.
Specifically, when τ is low, γi > 1/2 will result in our model only when the information
cost parameter s (which acts as a multiplier for the foreign information costs σ) is large
and when the subsidy share implicit in deposit insurance is low (ki is large). In the
opposite case, where s and ki are both small, the higher subsidization of foreign loans
is the dominant effect and γi < 1/2 holds in equilibrium.
3 Government regulation
The banking regulator of the government in country i can intervene in the financial
market through setting ki, the equity requirement for bank i’s lending. As a benchmark,
we first consider the case where no capital requirements are set by national regulators
and hence the constraint (8) does not bind. We then look at the implications of increases
in ki that are sufficiently large to affect the bank’s lending decisions in both markets.
3.1 Non-binding capital regulation
When the total loan volume that can be made by a bank exceeds its desired volume of
lending (Li < Ei/ki), government equity requirements do not limit the activities of the
bank. In this setting the banks make independent decisions regarding their lending in
their domestic and foreign markets. Thus, rather than making a decision regarding the
allocation of limited lending between the two markets to maximize (14), bank i is free
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to choose its lending in each market to maximize each of Πii ≡ αiiLii and Πji ≡ αjiLji.
The financial products provided by the two banks to firms in a particular market will
not be the same, in that the level of monitoring of loans by the domestic bank will
differ from that chosen by its foreign rival.
Total lending in market i will result from each bank choosing its optimal number
of loans, given its rival’s lending decision.16 Differentiating the bank’s profits in each
market, we can solve the first-order conditions to obtain the optimal loan volumes:
Lii =
αii
biq2ii
, Lij =
αij
biq2ij
. (20)
Taking into account the inverse demand function (3) that links the lending levels of
the two banks, we can derive the reaction functions for lending by the domestic and
foreign banks in the market:
Lii (Lij) =
1
2bi
[
A− (1− ki)
qii
−
s
2
−
ki
q2ii
]
−
qij
qii
Lij
2
;
Lij (Lii) =
1
2bi
[
A− (1− kj)
qij
−
(1 + σ) s
2
−
kj + τ
q2ij
]
−
qii
qij
Lii
2
.
(21)
It is immediately apparent from (21) that one bank’s lending is a strategic substitute
for loans from the other bank. Further, we can see that, for any level of funds being
provided by the domestic bank, the foreign bank’s lending is affected negatively by
both the trade cost τ that it faces, as well as the additional information cost of lending
abroad σ.
The slopes of the two reaction functions depend upon the levels of monitoring estab-
lished by the domestic and foreign banks, qii and qij, respectively. If these were the
same, both reaction functions would have a slope of (negative) 1/2. To get a clearer
idea of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium that would occur in lending in this market, as-
sume that the capital requirements are the same for both banks (k = ki = kj) and
return to our assumption that demand for goods in the two countries is the same
(b = bi = bj). Substituting this into (12) yields qij = qii/(1 + σ), showing that foreign
loans are less well-monitored than those made by a local lender. We can then use (21)
16We assume that each bank behaves as a Cournot competitor in that, in making its decision as to
the quantity of loans that it will offer in a market, it assumes that its competitor’s response will be
to maintain its level of lending.
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to find each bank’s optimal allocation of loans to its domestic and foreign markets, Lii
and Lij respectively. Solving yields:
Lii =
1
3b
{[
A− (1− k)
qii
−
s
2
]
−
[(1 + σ) τ − (1− σ) k]
q2ii
}
;
Lij =
(1 + σ)
3b
{[
A− (1− k)
qii
−
s
2
]
−
[2 (1 + σ) τ + (1 + 2σ) k]
q2ii
}
.
(22)
We see from (22) that the trade cost τ reduces lending in both markets but that this
effect is stronger in the bank’s foreign market. The role of the additional information
cost facing the foreign lender σ is less clear. If this cost is sufficiently large, the second
term in the expression for Lij will outweigh the first term, such that there is no foreign
lending. However, when τ and k are both small (so that the second terms in the braces
are negligible) while σ is positive, this will lead to the foreign bank lending more in
the market than its domestic rival. In the face of higher information costs, the foreign
bank will provide an inferior (that is, less well-monitored) product than that offered
by the local bank and this may crowd out the superior local product. As discussed
above [eq. (19)], this is due to implicit government subsidies that are proportional
to the banks’ risk-taking and thereby favour the foreign- over the domestic-lending
operations of each bank.
Finally, we can add together the two expressions in (22) to obtain the total amount of
lending when the capital requirement k increases the bank’s lending costs but does not
impose an overall constraint on the bank’s lending volume. Denoting this unconstrained
level of aggregate lending by Lui we find
Lui = Lii + Lji =
(2 + σ)
3b
[
A− (1− k)
qii
−
s
2
]
−
[(1 + σ)(1 + 2σ)τ + 2(1 + σ + σ2)k]
3bq2ii
.
(23)
In the following we shall compare Lui to the level of lending in the constrained regime.
3.2 Binding capital regulation
We now consider how the allocation of lending changes when a bank’s total lending Li
is constrained by its equity holdings and the equity requirement (8) imposed by the reg-
ulator. In this paper we analyze the effects of coordinated changes in the two countries’
capital requirements. In other words, we assume that the two, symmetric countries
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jointly set their capital requirements so as to maximize their combined welfare. This
assumption reflects the fact that, at least in the developed world, bank regulation has
been closely coordinated through the various Basel agreements.17 Also, since our focus
is on the effects of economic and financial integration, rather than on regulatory com-
petition between governments, our assumption of a coordinated regulatory regime is
an analytically simpler way to pin down optimal levels of ki.
18 Consequently, we con-
tinue our analysis under the assumption that there is a common capital requirement
k = (ki = kj) across the region.
We first discuss the conditions under which the lending constraint actually has an
impact on the equilibrium. Comparing the unconstrained level of lending in (23) with
the constrained level Li = Ei/k shows that L
u
i < Li must hold as k → 0. This is because
the available lending Li approaches infinity as k approaches zero, whereas L
u
i converges
towards a finite value. Hence the economy can only be in the constrained regime when
k is significantly above zero. Evaluating expressions at the maximum capital ratio of
unity (which implies full equity financing of the bank’s loans), a necessary condition
for the constrained regime to occur at some levels of k is then:
Li|k=1 = Ei < L
u
i |k=1 . (24)
Clearly, condition (24) must hold when the bank’s equity Ei is sufficiently low, relative
to the exogenous parameters that determine Lui in (23). We make this assumption in
the following.
We assume that governments set capital requirements to maximize a welfare function
that is a weighted sum of the expected profits of the domestic bank (Πi), tax revenues
(Ti), and consumer surplus in the domestic goods market (CSi). Hence the welfare
function of each government is
Wi = β1Πi + β2Ti + β3CSi, β1, β2, β3 ≥ 0. (25)
17The recent Basel III agreement, enacted in 2013, has increased the ratio of core capital (common
equity) to risk-weighted assets from 3.5% to 4.5%. In addition, an anticyclical capital buffer of 2.5%
of risk-weighted assets is to be built up until 2019.
18In the literature on regulatory competition, Sinn (1997) and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) have
shown that the non-cooperative setting of capital standards leads to a “race to the bottom” when
each government is mainly interested in the profits of its banking sector. Haufler and Maier (2016)
have recently demonstrated, however, that this result may be turned around, and a “race to the top”
in capital regulation occurs when governments give equal weighting to banks’ profits, tax revenues
and consumer surplus.
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This welfare function allows for several specifications, depending upon the weights β1,
β2, and β3 on profits, tax revenues, and consumer surplus, respectively. For example, if
the bank’s profits accrue partly to foreigners from outside the region (cf. footnote 8),
then β1 would be set lower than β2 and β3. Moreover, the expected subsidies paid
to banks may have to be financed by increases in distortive taxes, creating an excess
burden over and above the direct fiscal cost of the subsidy. This would imply setting
β2 above both β1 and β3. Obviously, when expected fiscal losses are so large that
they threaten the entire state of public finances (as happened to Ireland in 2010; see
footnote 3), then the welfare weight on tax revenues would have to be even higher.
The first component of (25), bank profits in country i, is given in (10). The expected
value of tax losses in country i equals the expected value of the loans made by its
domestic bank going bad in both countries, when these have been backed by insured
deposits as opposed to being funded from the domestic bank’s own equity. Tax revenue
Ti is therefore negative and given by:
Ti = −(1− k)BiLi, (26)
where Bi is the weighted average of failing loans in the home and foreign countries:
Bi ≡ (1− qii)γi + (1− qji)(1− γi). (27)
Finally, consumer surplus in country i depends on the number of successful loans
extended by both banks to firms in country i:
CSi =
b
2
[qiiγiLi + qij(1− γj)Lj]
2 . (28)
In the following, we first derive the effects of coordinated changes in capital require-
ments on each bank’s allocation of loans to the two markets and on equilibrium loan
prices. In a second step, we use these results to derive the effects of tighter capital
requirements on bank profits, tax revenues and consumer surplus. Finally, we discuss
the optimal coordinated choice of capital requirements that maximizes joint welfare in
the two countries.
In order to reduce further the complexity of the algebra, we evaluate all effects when
trade costs are zero (τ = 0). All of the effects that we derive are for the case where
countries are completely symmetric. Hence, for the remainder of this paper, we drop
the subscript i from variables. It must therefore be borne in mind that our comparative-
static exercises measure the impact on each country.
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Effect on market shares and loan prices. Differentiating (18) with respect to
the common capital requirement k, evaluating at τ = 0 and using symmetry gives
∂γ
∂k
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
sσ(1 + σ)
2bL[(1 + σ)2 + 1]k
> 0. (29)
A coordinated rise in k unambiguously raises the share of loans that each bank directs
to its domestic market. Intuitively, a rise in k reduces the implicit subsidization of
bank loans arising from savings deposit insurance. Since foreign loans are more heavily
subsidized due to their lower level of monitoring, reducing the subsidy redirects the
loans of a bank from its foreign to its domestic market.
The effects of tighter capital requirements on loan prices are obtained by differentiat-
ing (6). The appendix derives
∂R
∂k
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
bL
µ
[
φ
k
(
1 +
σ
[(1 + σ)2 + 1]
)
− (1 + γσ)
]
> 0, (30)
where φ is defined in (16) and µ ≡ s(1 + σ) + bL(1 + γσ) > 0.
Equation (30) can be signed with the help of condition (17), adjusted for τ = 0. Intu-
itively, the reduced lending volume caused by a coordinated increase in capital require-
ments directly reduces output and increases the commodity and loan price in each
country. A counteracting effect arises from the simultaneous shifting of both banks’
loans towards their home markets, where the monitoring intensity and hence the prob-
ability of success are higher. However, aggregate output, which equals the product of
lending volumes and their respective success rates [eq. (1)], must fall when interior
levels of monitoring are chosen and condition (17) holds. Hence the price of loans is
always driven up when k rises.
Effects on bank profits, taxpayers and consumers. We now turn to the effects
of tighter capital requirements on a bank’s profits. Substituting the optimized returns
on loans in (13) into (10), differentiating with respect to k and using symmetry yields
∂Π
∂k
=
{
−B −
[
φ2(1 + γσ)
2s(1 + σ)k
− 1
]
+
φ2σ
2s(1 + σ)
∂γ
∂k
+
(1 + γσ)φ
s(1 + σ)
∂R
∂k
}
L < 0, (31)
where B is defined in (27).
The first term in (31) is the direct effect of reducing the subsidization of the bank’s
lending by means of a tougher capital requirement. This term is clearly negative. The
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second term is also unambiguously negative [cf. condition (17)], as an increase in k
reduces the aggregate volume of profitable loans. In contrast, the third and fourth
effects are positive, as the increase in capital requirements shifts lending to the more
profitable home market [eq. (29)] and increases the price of loans from eq. (30). The
ambiguity can be resolved, however, because a binding constraint on lending implies
that the bank could increase its profits by expanding its aggregate number of loans.
Hence, if the constraint is binding, ∂Π/∂L > 0 must hold. Differentiating Π with
respect to L, holding k (and thus the subsidy rate for failing loans) fixed and noting
that ∂L/∂k = −L/k shows that the negative second effect must dominate the sum of
the third and fourth effects. Hence we can unambiguously conclude that the bank’s
profits fall following a tighter capital requirement, a result of both the direct first effect
and the sum of the indirect effects.
Turning to the effects on a country’s taxpayers, differentiating (26) with respect to k
and using (30) yields:
∂T
∂k
=
{
B +
(1− k)B
k
+
(1− k)(1 + γσ)
s(1 + σ)
+
(1− k)φσ
s(1 + σ)
∂γ
∂k
}
L > 0, (32)
which is unambiguously positive from (26) and (29). The first of the four terms in (32)
gives the direct effect of reducing the subsidy rate for failing bank loans. Total taxpayer
subsidies fall further due to the reduction in the overall loan volume (the second effect).
The third effect arises from the higher monitoring levels, and hence increased success
probabilities, that are induced by the more stringent capital requirements [see eq. (12)].
Finally, through the fourth effect, the increase in k shifts a higher share of the remaining
loan volume to the bank’s home market, where monitoring rates are higher. In sum,
the costs to taxpayers resulting from deposit insurance unambiguously decline with
higher equity requirements, as less of the financing is subsidized, lending falls in both
markets, and the induced increase in the bank’s monitoring of its lending portfolio
results in fewer bad debts.
In addition to the effects on the bank and taxpayers, the change in the equity require-
ment will have consequences for the quantities of goods produced in both markets and
will therefore have an impact on the country’s consumers. Differentiating the national
consumer surplus expression in (28) yields:
∂CS
∂k
= −QL
∂R
∂k
< 0, (33)
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where Q > 0 is expected national output [from (1)] and ∂R/∂k > 0 [from (30)].
The increased loan rate reflects the fall in aggregate output following tighter capital
requirements. Hence consumer surplus must also fall.
Optimal capital regulation. We can now analyze the optimal setting of the coor-
dinated capital requirement k by substituting the effects of higher capital requirements
on profits, tax revenues and consumer surplus [derived in equations (31)–(33)] into the
welfare function (25). By choosing an optimal, coordinated, capital requirement k, the
two governments jointly weigh the effects on the three components of national welfare
and directly affect the degree of “bail-in” versus “bail-out”, that is, the share of losses
borne by equity holders and taxpayers, respectively.
In order to analyze the conditions under which an interior optimum for k exists, we first
argue that ∂W/∂k > 0 holds at a lower bound for k, implying that a small increase in
k is raises the country’s welfare at this point. This natural lower bound is the level of
k at which the constraint on a bank’s total loan volume, as given in (8), just binds. We
denote this level by k˜ (> 0). Consequently, when evaluated at k˜, both the unconstrained
model analyzed in Section 3.1. and the constrained model of Section 3.2 yield the same
allocation. Since lending is effectively unconstrained at k˜, the indirect effects on banks’
profits, as given by the second, third and fourth effects in (31), must sum to zero at
this point. Moreover the negative first effect in the profit equation (31) is offset by the
positive first effect in the revenue equation (32) when the welfare weight on taxpayers
is at least as high as that on bank profits (that is, β1 ≤ β2). The remaining condition
for welfare to be rising in k at k = k˜ is that the positive indirect effects in the revenue
expression (32) dominate the negative effect on consumer surplus in (33). This will be
the case when β2 is sufficiently large relative to β3.
Consider now the opposite case where banks are required to fund their lending entirely
from equity, that is k = 1. Then none of the bank’s lending is insured and taxpayers
are exposed to no risk from bad debts. In that case, the second, third and fourth terms
in (32) are all zero, while the first term in (32) exactly offsets the first term in (31)
whenever β1 = β2. Moreover, the sum of the remaining effects on bank profits in (31)
is certainly negative at k = 1, as the banks are constrained in their overall lending
volume. Finally, the effect on consumer surplus in (33) is also negative. Under these
conditions ∂W/∂k < 0 holds unambiguously when evaluated at k = 1.
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These conditions ensure that W is rising at k = 0 but falling at k = 1, implying that
W is concave in the policy parameter k in the relevant interval. Moreover, W must be
continuous in k, because all components of national welfare are continuous in k. Hence
an interior maximum 0 < k < 1 must exist. We summarize the conditions for obtaining
such an interior optimum in the following proposition.19
Proposition 1 If the welfare weights on bank profits and tax revenues are equal and
sufficiently larger than the welfare weight on consumer surplus (β1 = β2 > β3), then a
joint policy optimum exists in which the two governments choose a coordinated, interior
capital requirement with 0 < k < 1.
Note that the conditions specified in Proposition 1 are sufficient, but not necessary,
for an interior policy equilibrium to exist. It is then straightforward to determine how
the optimal capital requirement k responds to the weights β attached to the different
components of national welfare. From the implicit function theorem, we get
∂k
∂β1
= −
∂Π/∂k
∂2W/∂k2
< 0,
∂k
∂β2
= −
∂T/∂k
∂2W/∂k2
> 0,
∂k
∂β3
= −
∂CS/∂k
∂2W/∂k2
< 0,
(34)
where the individual effects can be signed from (31)–(33). The comparative static effects
of changes in the welfare weights on the optimal level of k are summarized in:
Proposition 2 The optimal capital requirement k is rising in the weight that govern-
ments attach to tax revenues (β2) and falling in the weights that they attach to bank
profits (β1) and consumer surplus (β3).
Our results in this section are consistent with the empirical finding that worldwide
levels of cross-border lending have fallen since 2008 (see Figure 1). During this period,
19De Nicolo` et al. (2012) find a similar result in a dynamic banking model of a closed economy, as
bank efficiency and welfare first rise when capital standards are increased, and then fall when capital
standards become “too stringent”. In their model, however, the trade-off arises from behavioural re-
sponses within the banking sector, not from the diverging interests of banks, taxpayers and consumers,
as is the case here.
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capital requirements have been increased through the coordinated Basel III process (see
footnote 17), but also through unilateral measures taken in several countries, including
the United States and Switzerland. In the setting of our model, this increase in k can be
motivated by a higher valuation of taxpayer costs (i.e., an increase in β2) following the
public bailout of banks that has occurred in many countries (Proposition 2). Moreover,
our above analysis has shown that higher capital requirements not only reduce the
overall volume of lending [eq. (30)], but also shift lending activities towards the domestic
market [eq. (29)]. This strongly suggests that the change in regulation policy that
occurred after the financial crisis has contributed to lower levels of cross-border lending.
In our analysis of financial integration in the following section, we treat the capital
requirement k as exogenous (and common to both countries), but interpret it as hav-
ing been chosen optimally before any changes in the costs of foreign lending have
occurred. In Section 5, we will then analyze, by means of numerical simulations, how
the governments’ optimal capital requirement is affected by this financial integration.
4 Financial integration
Improvements in technology or information can reduce the cost to a bank of lending in
a foreign market. This enhances the entry of financial institutions into foreign markets
and has implications for the overall level of lending as well as the quality of loans. In our
model we have two parameters that capture different elements of financial integration.
Firstly, a reduction in the trade cost parameter τ facilitates access to the foreign market
but leaves unchanged the extra costs of monitoring foreign loans. Secondly, improved
information on foreign loans are captured by a decrease in the foreign information cost
parameter σ. As we shall show, changes in these two parameters have very different
welfare implications in our model.
4.1 Reduced costs for trade in services
We start with the analysis of reductions in trade costs τ . One example of reduced trade
costs is the use of a common currency in the Euro area, which eliminates the need for
hedging exchange rate risks. Another example comes from the current initiative to
create a capital markets union among the EU member states. A core element in this
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initiative is the increased use of “simple, transparent and standardized” securitization,
which is aimed explicitly at reducing the costs of cross-border lending (see European
Commission, 2015a,b).
In parallel to our analysis in the previous section, we start by deriving the effects of this
policy change on a bank’s allocation of its total lending and on the price of loans. In a
second step, we then derive the effects on profits, tax revenues and consumer surplus.
In contrast to our analysis in Section 3.2, we analyze the effects of changes in trade
costs from an arbitrary initial equilibrium where τ is strictly positive.
Effect on market shares and prices. Differentiating a bank’s allocation of loans
in (18) with respect to τ yields
∂γ
∂τ
=
s2(1 + σ)2
φ2bLε
> 0, (35)
where ε ≡ [(1 + σ)2 + 1][s(1 + σ) + bL(1 + γσ)]− τs2σ(1 + σ)2 > 0.
By lowering the additional cost of supplying loans in its foreign market, a fall in τ
unambiguously reduces the share of the overall loan volume that a bank supplies to its
domestic market. Using this result in the differentiation of the price (6), we find
∂R
∂τ
=
−s2σ(1 + σ)2
φε
< 0. (36)
Since a fall in τ redirects a fixed loan volume towards the foreign market, where the
probability of success is lower [see eq. (12)], total output falls as a result of this change,
raising the price of output and loans.
Effect on bank profits, taxpayers and consumers. Differentiating optimized
profits in (13) with respect to τ and using (35) and (36) gives
∂Π
∂τ
= −(1− γ)L+
s(1 + σ)
2φ2bε
[
φ2ση + 2sτ(1 + σ)µ
]
, (37)
where µ (> 0) is given in (30) and ε (> 0) is defined in (35), while (using L = E/k)
η ≡ s(1 + σ)− b(1 + γσ)
E
k
≷ 0. (38)
The first term in (37) gives the direct effect of changing trade costs on the profits of
the bank. Through this effect, a fall in τ raises the bank’s profits by making its foreign
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loans less expensive. The second term in (37) captures the effects on profits resulting
from the higher share of foreign lending induced by a lower τ [eq. (35)]. A fall in
trade costs will hurt the bank’s profits through this second effect, if the foreign market
is less profitable than the domestic market. This will be the case when the higher
information costs of foreign lending dominate the higher implicit subsidies through
the government’s deposit insurance, i.e., when η > 0. From (38) this is, in turn, more
likely when the governments’ regulation policy is strict (k is high). Conversely, if the
regulation policy is lax and η < 0, then the bank will benefit from shifting its lending
activities towards the more highly subsidized foreign market, provided that τ is small
in the initial equilibrium.20 In this last case, a fall in trade costs τ unambiguously
increases bank profits.
Next, we consider the effects on taxpayers in a country. Differentiating (26), substitut-
ing in from (35) and (36) and simplifying gives
∂T
∂τ
= (1− k)
s2σ(1 + σ)2
bφε
> 0. (39)
As this effect is unambiguously positive, a fall in trade costs reduces tax revenue, in
that it increases the subsidy payments from taxpayers to the bank. Lower trade costs
increase the share of the bank’s lending that is allocated to the foreign country, where
monitoring is lower due to higher information costs. Thus, a fall in trade costs results
in a larger share of loans being exposed to the higher risk of failure.
Finally, we analyze the effects of a change in τ on consumer surplus. From (28) we get,
with the help of (35) and (36),
∂CS
∂τ
=
s2σ(1 + σ)2
φε
Q > 0. (40)
This effect is again positive, implying that lower trade costs reduce consumer surplus.
Since the overall loan volume does not change, due to the constraint imposed by the
binding capital requirement, a fall in τ affects consumer surplus only through the
increased share of lending in the foreign market. The lower success probability of foreign
loans means that expected output falls, with a consequent decline in consumer surplus.
In comparing the impact of trade integration in (37)–(40), we see that there is a po-
tential conflict between the interests of banks on the one hand and consumers and
20Note that, from (18), τ > 0 unambiguously makes reliance on the home market more profitable.
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taxpayers on the other. Trade integration (i.e., a fall in trade costs) will benefit banks,
at least when regulation policy is lax (k is low) and trade costs τ are low in the initial
equilibrium. At the same time, trade integration induces each bank to shift a larger
share of its loans to the foreign market, where monitoring levels are lower. This implies
higher failure rates for loans, harming both taxpayers and consumers.
Given these conflicting effects, the implications of lower trade costs for welfare in each
of the two symmetric countries [eq. (25)] will generally be ambiguous. However, when
the welfare weight on bank profits (β1) is sufficiently low, for example because a large
share of the banks is owned by residents of third countries, then trade integration will
harm both countries in the region. We summarize these results as follows.
Proposition 3 A reduction in the trade costs of cross-border lending (τ) reduces con-
sumer surplus and raises the expected losses of taxpayers in both countries. When the
weight of bank profits in the national welfare functions is sufficiently low, trade inte-
gration also reduces aggregate welfare in each country.
Proposition 3 shows that trade integration in the financial sector may have different,
and more negative effects, as compared to trade integration in manufacturing or other
services. The welfare results in Brander and Krugman (1983) are ambiguous in general
but can be signed in two special cases. When trade costs are low, further reductions are
welfare improving as the increase in competition yields higher consumer surplus while
the increased two-way trade in the identical product is almost costless. The contrast in
results arises for two reasons. First, in our model of lending, trade integration cannot
expand the overall supply of loans when binding capital requirements are set by regula-
tors, while production expands in Brander and Krugman. Moreover, by incorporating
a failure probability that is higher for loans to foreign firms, trade integration increases
the aggregate risks in the banking sector which, in our model, are partly shifted onto
taxpayers by means of savings deposit insurance. At the same time, banks are likely to
welcome trade integration, partly because of the higher implicit subsidies they receive
from taxpayers when they expand their foreign lending.
4.2 Reduced information costs abroad
We now turn to the effects of a decline in the foreign information cost parameter σ.
As we have argued above, these costs arise primarily from differences in national laws,
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in particular with respect to insolvency, collateral and securities laws. Accordingly, a
core example of reduced foreign information costs lies in the coordination, or partial
harmonization, of these areas of national law. In the European Union, this coordina-
tion represents an important element in the recent capital markets union initiative (see
European Commission, 2015a, part 6). Another example comes from the Single Super-
visory Mechanism of the European banking union, which aims to harmonize banking
standards in EU countries. Increasing the information about the liquidity and solvency
of foreign banks is another relevant example of reduced foreign information costs, be-
cause a substantial share of lending abroad occurs to foreign financial institutions.
We proceed in the same way as above, but simplify the analysis once again by evaluating
the derivatives at τ = 0.
Effect on market shares and prices. We differentiate a bank’s allocation of loans
in (18) with respect to σ. Evaluating at τ = 0 gives
∂γ
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
s[(1 + σ)2 + (2σ + 1)]− 4bL(1 + σ)
2bL[(1 + σ)2 + 1]
≷ 0. (41)
In contrast to a fall in trade costs τ that unambiguously reduces γ [see eq. (35)], a
fall in the information costs for lending abroad has an ambiguous effect on the bank’s
allocation of loans. A lower level of σ will reduce the domestic loan share γ only when
the transaction cost parameter s is large and the capital requirement k is high, implying
a low equilibrium loan level from L = E/k [cf. the discussion of eq. (19)]. In this case,
a fall in σ reduces the cost disadvantage of foreign loans and therefore lowers γ. In
contrast, a fall in σ will increase γ when the regulation policy is lax and the loan
allocation is primarily determined by the higher taxpayer subsidy on foreign loans.
The fall in σ then reduces this subsidy advantage of foreign loans and raises γ, shifting
lending to the domestic market.
The effect on the price of loans in equilibrium [in (6)] is derived in the appendix and
given by
∂R
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
φbL
µ
[
(1− γ)
(1 + σ)
− σ
∂γ
∂σ
]
> 0 ⇐⇒
bE
k
[(1 + σ)2 + 1+ 2σ]− sσ(2 + σ) > 0,
(42)
where µ > 0 is defined in (30). Equation (42) shows that the direct effect of σ on the
loan rate is positive, implying that lower information costs for foreign loans reduce the
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loan rate. This is because a smaller σ increases the monitoring of foreign loans, raising
expected output and lowering its price. The indirect effect is ambiguous and depends
on the change in γ, as given in (41). A sufficient, but not a necessary condition, for
the overall effect to be positive is that ∂γ/∂σ < 0 holds. In this case a fall in σ will
reallocate loans towards the domestic market, where the success probability is higher.
Even if ∂γ/∂σ > 0, so that a fall in σ shifts lending to the more risky foreign market,
a fall in σ will still reduce the loan rate when the capital requirement k chosen by
the two countries is not too strict in the initial equilibrium (k is not too high). In the
following we assume that this condition is met so that ∂R/∂σ > 0 holds in (42).
Effect on bank profits, taxpayers and consumers. We again analyze the effects
of changes in information costs abroad on the bank, taxpayers and consumers in one
of the countries. The impact on the bank’s profits is found by differentiating (10),
using (41)–(42) to yield:
∂Π
∂σ
=
−φη
2bs(1 + σ)
∂R
∂σ
. (43)
The effect of a fall in σ on the bank’s profits shows a similar ambiguity to that of a
reduction in τ [see eq. (37)]. When condition (42) holds, the sign of ∂Π/∂σ depends
once again on the sign of η, and hence on the importance of higher information costs
for foreign loans [as parameterized by s(1 + σ) in (38)], relative to the higher implicit
subsidy for foreign loans [as captured in the term b(1+γσ)E/k in (38)]. When regulation
policy is tight and k is large, the first effect dominates and η > 0. In this case the bank
profits from the lower information costs of lending abroad. When k is low, however, we
get η < 0. In this case, the fall in σ increases γ from (41), as subsidies for foreign loans
are reduced while, at the same time, the bank’s profit margins are higher for foreign
loans. Hence the bank loses from the reallocation of its lending towards its domestic
market.
To obtain the impact on taxpayers, we differentiate (26) and use (42) to get
∂T
∂σ
=
−(1− k)
b
∂R
∂σ
< 0, (44)
which is negative when condition (42) holds, implying that taxpayers benefit from a
reduction in σ. Intuitively, since the total lending volume is fixed by the capital require-
ment, the effect of a lower σ on tax revenue depends only on the average share of loans
that are successful. Since reduced information costs for foreign loans increase optimal
monitoring levels for these loans, risks for taxpayers are reduced and tax revenue rises.
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Finally, differentiating (28) with respect to σ yields the effect on consumer surplus:
∂CS
∂σ
= −Q
∂R
∂σ
< 0. (45)
Thus consumers also benefit from lower information costs abroad. The fall in σ causes
the share of successful loans to rise through increased monitoring of foreign loans. This
reduces the loan rate and expands output, translating directly into a positive effect on
consumer surplus.
Collecting these effects on the components of national welfare, we see that the benefits
of financial integration do materialize for a reduction in the information costs for foreign
loans. We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 4 If capital regulation is not too strict [condition (42) holds], a reduction
in the information costs of cross-border lending, σ, increases tax revenues and consumer
surplus in both countries. If the direct effect of falling information costs dominates for
banks [η > 0 holds in (37)], their profits will also rise. National welfare will then
increase in both countries for any combination of welfare weights (β1, β2, β2).
A comparison of Propositions 3 and 4 reveals that the effects of economic integration
can be very different, depending on the type of cost to cross-border lending that is
lowered. If trade costs for foreign loans are reduced, while the information costs for
these loans remain unchanged, then financial integration may have detrimental effects.
This could be the case, for example, in an integrated payments area like the Eurozone,
where transaction costs for cross-border lending are further reduced by securitization,
but high information costs for foreign loans remain due to nationally diverging laws and
regulations. Our analysis therefore suggests that it is essential for such liberalization of
financial markets to be accompanied by policy measures that reduce the information
costs of lending abroad, such as coordinating national laws that affect the recovery of
defaulting loans.
5 Financial integration and optimal regulation
A final issue in our analysis is how financial integration changes the optimal regula-
tion policy. Specifically, we ask how reductions in the trade cost parameter τ and the
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Table 1: Reducing transaction costs for foreign loans (τ)
τ k γ R Π T CS W
Case 1: Low welfare weight of tax revenue (β2 = 3)
(1) τ = 0.25 0.516 0.695 7.543 6.377 -0.686 3.018 7.339
(2) τ = 0|k=k¯ 0.516 0.606 7.604 6.530 -0.715 2.870 7.254
(3) τ = 0 0.475 0.583 7.480 6.764 -0.888 3.176 7.277
Case 2: High welfare weight of tax revenue (β2 = 8)
(4) τ = 0.25 0.929 0.963 8.259 5.109 -0.029 1.516 6.391
(5) τ = 0|k=k¯ 0.929 0.844 8.317 4.939 -0.034 1.416 6.087
(6) τ = 0 0.937 0.848 8.326 4.918 -0.029 1.402 6.088
Note: Parameters held constant: E = 2, s = 10, A = 10, b = 1, σ = 0.5, β1 = β3 = 1
foreign information cost parameter σ affect the optimal, coordinated choice of capital
requirement k. The determinants of the optimal capital requirement, as discussed in
Section 3.2, are too complex, however, to answer this question analytically. We therefore
consider some numerical examples that highlight the patterns of optimal responses.
Table 1 reports the results from a first set of numerical simulations that show the
effects of reducing the trade cost parameter τ . The table is divided into two cases,
corresponding to different values of β2, the welfare weight on tax revenues. In Case
1, the weight on tax revenues is relatively low (β2 = 3) while Case 2 has a higher
weight (β2 = 8). From Proposition 2 this implies a higher capital requirement in the
government’s optimum in Case 2. Rows (1)-(3) correspond to Case 1 while rows (4)-(6)
repeat the same set of exercises for Case 2.
Rows (1) and (4) in Table 1 give the values of the variables of interest in an initial
equilibrium with trade costs equal to τ = 0.25. Rows (2) and (5) report the effects of
a fall in trade costs to τ = 0 when the capital requirement is held fixed at its initial
level. The resulting changes in equilibrium values thus correspond to our analytical
results in Section 4.1, where we have also held capital requirements fixed. Finally, rows
(3) and (6) give the equilibrium values for all variables when capital requirements are
optimally adjusted to the reduction in τ . In all numerical examples, we have confirmed
that the total volume of lending is indeed below the firms’ optimized lending volumes
in the unconstrained model of Section 3.1.21
21The optimized capital standards fulfill the requirements for an interior solution, k˜ < k < 1, even
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Table 2: Reducing information costs for foreign loans (σ)
σ k γ R Π T CS W
(1) σ = 0.75 0.762 0.533 6.971 7.198 -0.216 4.588 10.706
(2) σ = 0.5|k=k¯ 0.762 0.513 6.874 7.372 -0.193 4.886 11.294
(3) σ = 0.25|k=k¯ 0.762 0.498 6.720 7.631 -0.156 5.379 12.228
(4) σ = 0|k=k¯ 0.762 0.500 6.486 7.978 -0.101 6.174 13.649
(5) σ = 0.5 0.695 0.495 6.714 7.531 -0.314 5.400 11.360
(6) σ = 0.25 0.639 0.481 6.380 7.894 -0.389 6.552 12.498
(7) σ = 0 0.601 0.500 6.003 8.199 -0.397 7.987 14.200
Note: Parameters held constant: E = 3, s = 7, A = 10, b = 1, τ = 0, β1 = β3 = 1, β2 = 5.
A first result that emerges from Table 1 is that total welfare does indeed fall following
a reduction in τ , and this is true in both Cases 1 and 2. Bank profits rise in Case 1
but fall in Case 2, whereas tax revenues and consumer surplus fall in both cases when
the capital requirement remains fixed [rows (2) and (5)]. These results correspond to
our findings in Section 4.1, as summarized in Proposition 3. The new result is that the
optimal capital requirement falls in Case 1 but rises in Case 2, demonstrating that the
endogenous response of k to a reduction in τ is ambiguous. Intuitively, when the welfare
weight of tax revenues is sufficiently low, as in Case 1, the optimal adjustment of k is
dominated by the increased profit opportunities of banks resulting from the lower trade
costs. Hence the capital requirement is relaxed, in order to increase the total volume
of lending. In Case 2, in contrast, where the welfare weight of tax revenues is large,
the optimal response is to tighten the capital requirement in order to limit tax revenue
losses following the fall in τ . Finally, note that the endogenous response of k does not
overturn the negative overall welfare effects caused by the reduction in τ .
We now turn to the effects of reducing the extra information cost of foreign lending, σ.
The results for this set of numerical exercises in given in Table 2. Here we consider
only a single case, but reduce σ in several steps. Again we report the results when the
capital requirement is held fixed at its initial level [rows (2) to (4)], and when it is free
to adjust optimally to the changed exogenous conditions [rows (5) to (7)].
Table 2 shows that, in contrast to the reduction in the transaction cost parameter τ , a
fall in the foreign information cost parameter σ increases profits, tax revenues and con-
though the welfare weights used in the simulations differ from the sufficient conditions in Proposition 1.
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sumer surplus, and thereby increases aggregate welfare when the capital requirement
is held fixed. This corresponds to our analytical results in Section 4.2, as summarized
in Proposition 4. Moreover, the induced change in the share of domestic lending γi is,
indeed, ambiguous. It initially falls below 1/2 and then returns to 1/2 as σ is incremen-
tally reduced. Finally, the optimal coordinated capital requirement falls continuously
as σ falls. The difference in this case to that of the falling trade cost τ , is that the de-
cline in information costs benefits all components of national welfare when the capital
requirement is held fixed. As gains to consumers and banks rise more than proportion-
ately as total lending volume increases, whereas losses to taxpayers increase (roughly)
linearly, the optimal policy is to reduce k for a wide range of welfare weights β2.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have set up a two-country model with duopolistic banks that are
engaged in cross-border lending. These loans are made to competitive, producing firms
and therefore have real effects on the economy. Banks are constrained in their aggregate
lending activity by government regulation, but can decide how to allocate the total loan
volume between their domestic and the foreign markets, and how strictly they monitor
their customers in each country. Banks face limited liability when their loans fail,
because their funds partly come from savings deposits that are guaranteed by national
governments. This part of the default risk is effectively shifted to taxpayers, causing a
moral hazard problem for the banks’ monitoring decision and distorting their lending
activities towards the foreign market. Governments choose capital requirements so as
to maximize domestic welfare, given the exogenous weights they put on the interests
of banks, taxpayers and consumers.
In this setting we have analyzed the effects of financial integration on the different
agents in our model, as well as on aggregate national welfare. We find that the desir-
ability of integration depends crucially on the type of costs for cross-border lending that
are reduced. If financial integration is mainly associated with a fall in trade costs, the
monitoring levels for foreign loans cannot be expected to rise. More risky foreign lending
may then replace safer domestic lending in equilibrium, with adverse consequences for
consumers and taxpayers. On the other hand, if financial integration is driven mainly
by a fall in the information costs for foreign loans, then the optimal monitoring of these
32
loans will rise and banks, consumers and taxpayers can all be expected to benefit from
this financial integration. We conclude that mere reductions in the transactions costs
of cross-border lending can be harmful, unless they are accompanied by measures that
reduce the information costs specific to foreign lending.
These results are particularly relevant for the European Union, where the introduction
of the Euro area has significantly lowered transaction costs for cross-border lending
while plans are under way to reduce these costs further in a capital markets union. Our
results suggests that it is then essential for the European Union to reduce the informa-
tion costs of foreign lending at the same time. The Single Supervisory Mechanism of the
European banking union represents a step in this direction by harmonizing the stan-
dards of financial institutions, among which a substantial part of cross-border lending
occurs. Further measures are likely to be needed, however, with national insolvency,
collateral and securities laws needing greater international coordination.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. One possible extension would be
to introduce a more complex output sector that is characterized by imperfect com-
petition and some market power vis-a`-vis banks in determining the equilibrium loan
rate. Another extension would be to incorporate a richer set of government policies.
For example, it would be possible to consider policy measures that impact upon for-
eign lenders alone, say through a special levy on the costs of lending by non-domestic
institutions. Equally, governments might negotiate reciprocal access to their domestic
markets for foreign banks that would have exactly the opposite effect to this special
levy. We leave these extensions to further research.
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Appendix
Derivation of equation (30)
Differentiating (3) and using Ri = Pi from (5) gives
∂Ri
∂k
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
= −b
[
γiLi
s
(
∂Ri
∂k
+ 1
)
+ qiiLi
∂γi
∂k
+ qiiγi
∂Li
∂k
+
(1− γj)Lj
s(1 + σ)
(
∂Rj
∂k
+ 1
)
− qijLj
∂γj
∂k
+ qij(1− γj)
∂Lj
∂k
]
.
Using the symmetry assumption adopted in the paper, R = Ri = Rj, γ = γi = γj and
L = Li = Lj. Cancelling terms gives
∂R
∂k
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
bL
µ
[
(1 + γσ)
(
φ
k
− 1
)
− φσ
∂γ
∂k
]
, (A.1)
where φ and µ are defined in (16) and (30). Substituting ∂γ/∂k from (29) and substi-
tuting out for γ using (18) gives eq. (30) in the main text.
Derivation of equation (42)
Differentiating (6) with respect to σ gives in a first step
∂Ri
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
= b
[
(1− γj)Ljφ
s(1 + σ)2
−
γiLi
s
∂Ri
∂σ
− qiiLi
∂γi
∂σ
−
(1− γj)Lj
s(1 + σ)
∂Rj
∂σ
+ qijLj
∂γj
∂σ
]
.
Using symmetry and collecting terms gives
∂R
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
φbL
µ
[
(1− γ)
(1 + σ)
− σ
∂γ
∂σ
]
,
which corresponds to the first part of eq. (42) in the main text. Substituting in ∂γ/∂σ
from (41) and using
(1− γ)
(1 + σ)
=
2bL(1 + σ)− sσ
2bL[(1 + σ)2 + 1]
from (18), gives
∂R
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
φ(1 + σ)
µ[(1 + σ)2 + 1]2
{
bL[(1 + σ)2 + 1 + 2σ]− sσ(2 + σ)
}
. (A.2)
From (A.2) follows the condition for ∂R/∂σ > 0 in eq. (42).
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